Why the Increasing Role of Public Policy in California\u27s Unfair Competition Law Is a Slippery Step in the Wrong Direction by Taylor, Joshua D.
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 52 | Issue 5 Article 4
7-2001
Why the Increasing Role of Public Policy in
California's Unfair Competition Law Is a Slippery
Step in the Wrong Direction
Joshua D. Taylor
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Joshua D. Taylor, Why the Increasing Role of Public Policy in California's Unfair Competition Law Is a Slippery Step in the Wrong Direction,
52 Hastings L.J. 1131 (2001).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol52/iss5/4
Why the Increasing Role of Public
Policy in California's Unfair




[California] has pioneered the use of bounty-hunting litigation by
private parties to enforce public policy.1
Introduction
Do you have a grievance? Has a particular business or industry
upset you? Even if you have not suffered any actual injury, if you live
in California-you're in luck. You may be able to sue under the
California Business and Professions Code section 17200, California's
Unfair Competition Act [hereinafter "UCL" or "17200"],2 and your
chances of convincing an attorney to represent you are surprisingly
good. Partly due to its grant of attorney's fees for successful suits and
partly due to the vast uncertainty as to what may qualify as a UCL
cause of action, this statute has become one of the favorites of the
plaintiff's bar. "Many believe that the past decade has seen a boom in
such [UCL] claims."'3 Stan Ulrich, of the California Law Revision
Commission, said that, "[a]lthough I can't prove it, I believe there's a
huge underground economy in 17200 claims." 4
* J.D., U.C. Hastings College of the Law, 2001; B.A., University of California at
Berkeley, 1998.
1. Tim W. Ferguson, The Lawsuit Business, FORBES, May 18, 1998, at 110 (citation
omitted).
2. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200-17209 (West 1997 & Supp. 2001).
3. Sheila Muto, Unfair Competition Law Faces High-Court Scrutiny, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 3, 1999, at CA3.
4. Id.
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The abuse of the UCL by plaintiffs is becoming gradually more
apparent with each new frivolous lawsuit filed under the guise of
unfair competition. Consider the following examples of suits based
upon a UCL cause of action: A suit that alleged unfair competition
because a company packaged computer software in "containers that
were filled to substantially less than their capacity."'5 The maker of
Pokemon trading cards was accused of corrupting the nation's youth
by promoting gambling.6 Tonka Corporation and Toys 'R Us were
sued because their advertisements for their "Easy Bake" oven
claimed a ten-minute baking time, but this did not allow for time to
mix the snack powder or pre-heat the oven.7 A cereal company was
sued because it claimed that its "Honeycomb" and "Alpha-Bits"
products were cereals-the plaintiff contended they should be labeled
candies.8 "A common thread runs through all these lawsuits: They
were initiated by lawyers, not injured consumers, and they all seek
court ordered attorney fees. The only beneficiaries of these cases,
most of which settle for a nuisance value, are the lawyers who bring
them."9 In light of the potential for UCL abuse, it is not surprising
that one of the agenda items on a recent plaintiff lawyers' annual
retreat was "How Business and Professions Code Section 17200 Can
be a 'Value Added' Component of Your Litigation."'10
Beyond a quest for attorney's fees, there is a second
characteristic shared by all of the aforementioned UCL cases; a
plaintiff deemed an act to be 'wrong' and sought relief through the
UCL. One must be mindful, however, of the distinction between an
act that is considered by* an individual to be morally or ethically
repugnant and an act that is (or should be) proscribed by law. The
UCL is quickly becoming a statute that can be used to enforce one's
own notions of right and wrong. The judiciary in this state has tacitly
condoned the idea of basing a UCL cause of action solely upon a
violation of public policy. It is the Author's contention that this
5. Intervention Inc. v. Symantec Corp., No. C96-04477 (Contra Costa County Super.
Ct. filed Oct. 9, 1996); see also Del Stewart, The Latest Kind of Amazing Lawsuits, SAN
DIEGO UNION TRIB., Sep. 18, 1997, at B-11; John H. Sullivan, Call it Gonzo Law: The
Unfair Competition Statute Covers any Claim, if it's Presented with a Straight Face, CAL. L.
Bus., Jan. 10, 2000, at 22.
6. Sullivan, supra note 5, at 22.
7. M
8. Comm. on Children's Television, Inc. v. Gen. Foods Corp., 673 P.2d 660 (Cal.
1983).
9. Stewart, supra note 5, at B-11.
10. Sullivan, supra note 5, at 22.
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would result in a disastrous state of vigilantism and judicial
uncertainty.
This Note will discuss the problems associated with a statute that
allows a plaintiff to enforce his own particular notions of desirable
public policy. Part I will discuss the flaws of the UCL itself, namely
its vague statutory language and over-inclusive standing requirement.
These shortcomings in the UCL have allowed private actors to use
the statute to advance their own policy goals. Part II tracks this
phenomenon through three California Supreme Court UCL cases,
showing how the shortcomings of the UCL were manipulated to
enforce a private policy agenda. Part III will then examine the
language and trends from the past UCL cases to predict the future of
public policy in UCL jurisprudence if steps are not taken by either the
California Supreme Court or the California Legislature to correct
existing problems. Finally, Part IV offers some suggestions to
alleviate the current trend of UCL abuses.
I. UCL Problems
A. Vague Statutory Language
The UCL prohibits unfair competition, and states that "unfair
competition shall mean and include any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent
business act or practice."" The statute was originally enacted to
codify the common law prohibition on name infringement. 12 In 1933
the statute was amended to "include 'unfair or fraudulent business
practices' as well as false advertising."'13 Throughout the early period
of its existence, even though the statutory language was vague, the
law was still primarily used to combat name infringement.
14
In 1963 the Legislature again amended [the UCL] to add
"unlawful" business practices to the list of proscribed conduct. In
doing so, it expanded the definition of unfair competition with
respect to conduct violating statutory prohibitions, for now any
11. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200.
12. Seong Hwan Kin, California's Unfair Competition Act: Will It Give Rise to Yet
Another 'Wave' in Smoking and Health Litigation?, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 193, 198-99
(1994); Wesley J. Howard, Note, Former Civil Code Section 3369: A Study in Judicial
Interpretation, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 705,707 (1979).
13. Howard, supra note 12, at 706.
14. See id. at 707.
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business practice that violated an independent statutory duty was
an instance of unfair competition.15
Finally, "[i]n 1992 the Legislature expanded the scope of the
unfair competition law to include unfair business acts as well as
practices .... This change did not alter the meaning of [the UCL] but
merely extended it to include single instances of conduct.' 6
The first prong of the UCL covers any business act or practice
that is unlawful. "To bring an unfair competition claim based on the
first prong of section 17200, a plaintiff must allege and establish all
requisite elements which constitute a violation of the underlying
statute."'17 The underlying statute may be civil or criminal, and there
is no requirement that it relate to the realm of unfair competition. 8
Thus, the "unlawful" prong of the UCL is extraordinarily broad,
allowing a plaintiff considerable latitude in finding a basis for a UCL
cause of action.
The second prong of the UCL prohibits "unfair" business acts or
practices. The word "unfair" is seemingly an all-inclusive term, and is
not easily defined to yield a reliable and predictable standard. The
California Supreme Court has struggled with the task of
administering a test to determine whether or not an act in question is
sufficiently unfair to violate the UCL.19 Furthermore, the act in
question may be unfair even if it is not unlawful.20 The statute is
written in the disjunctive (using the word "or") and thus only requires
a violation of one of the prongs for a violation of the statute. The
legislative use of the general term "unfair" has substantially
broadened the basis from which a plaintiff can state a cause of action.
The third prong of the UCL, "fraudulent," is the least
ambiguous, and therefore does not merit considerable discussion.
Included within this term are causes of action for fraud and
misrepresentation. Arguably, this prong is unnecessary because
anything that falls within the reach of the fraudulent prong would
likely also be deemed an "unfair" business practice.
Thus, the UCL affords a plaintiff considerable leeway in phrasing
a pleading because of the variety of ways to violate the statute. The
15. Cel-Tech Communications, Inc.v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 973 P.2d 527, 549 (Cal.
1999) (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
16. Id. at 550.
17. Kim, supra note 12, at 200.
18. See, e.g., Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 950 P.2d 1086 (Cal.
1998) (holding the sale of cigarettes to minors was a violation of a predicate statute
sufficient to support a UCL cause of action).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 82-95.
20. Cel-Tech Communications, Inc., 973 P.2d at 540.
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legislative intent in drafting the UCL was to write a broad statute that
would encompass most or all methods of unfair competition-even
those unknown at the time of its drafting.21 However, the broad
scope of the UCL has allowed plaintiffs to pervert the original
legislative intent. The UCL has been asserted as a cause of action for
tactical advantages in trial, increasing the leverage for settlement, and
the permissible scope of discovery 22 There is no current deterrent for
a plaintiffs attorney not to do this, as he may, "without tangible
evidence of harm, sue a defendant for being 'unfair' and know the
allegations will rocket past summary judgment."' 3 Thus, the breadth
of the UCL means that a plaintiff has nothing to lose by adding a
UCL cause of action to his complaint-an invitation for abuse.
B. The UCL's Over-Inclusive Standing Requirement
The UCL is privately enforceable.24 A claim under the UCL
may be brought "by any person acting for the interests of itself, its
members or the general public."25  This limitless standing
requirement furthers the potential for abuse, as "[t]hose suing on
behalf of the general public can range from plaintiffs having a narrow
dispute with a defendant in a business context, who tack on the
[UCL] claim for discovery and settlement advantages, to plaintiffs
serving a true private attorney general function."
26
This private right of action is not found in the analogous federal
statute, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") Act.27 "[Cloncern
over the breadth of the 'unfairness' standard in the FTC Act led
Congress to severely limit enforcement of the statute to actions by the
Federal Trade Commission rather than by private litigants."' In
Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp.29 a federal appeals court explained
the rationale behind limiting enforcement of the FTC Act to the
government:
[The] breadth of prohibition [against unfair practices in the FTC
Act] carried with it a danger that the statute might become a source
of vexatious litigation. Expertise was called for.., to avoid using
21. Id.
22. Sullivan, supra note 5, at 22.
23. Id.
24. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17204.
25. Id
26. Sullivan, supra note 5, at 22.
27. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 45 etseq. (1994).
28. David M. Axelrad et al., California's "Little FTC Act". Benefitting Consumers, or
Lawyers?, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, Dec. 4,1998, at 17.
29. 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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the statute as a vehicle for trivial or frivolous claims.... Private
litigants are not subject to the same constraints. They may institute
piecemeal lawsuits, reflecting disparate concerns and not a
coordinated enforcement program. The consequence would
burden not only the defendants selected but also the judicial
system. It was to avoid such possibilities ... that Congress focused
on the FTC as an exclusive enforcement authority.
30
Of the other states that have enacted similar statutes as
California's UCL, few have the broad standing provisions of the
California statute. Today, all fifty states have some version of a
consumer protection statute, or "little FTC Act."131 Not every
analogous state statute offers a private plaintiff a right of action.
However, California's UCL authorizes standing for a private party
without the limitations that are imposed in other states. "As a 1996
report to the California Law Review Commission notes: 'None of the
16 other state jurisdictions with their own version of California's
Unfair Competition Act give private attorney general status to any
person without qualification."'
32
The crux of the problem is that the California UCL has no
requirement that a private plaintiff have been personally harmed, or
even have a personal stake in the litigation, before a UCL action can
be asserted.33 Additionally, if the plaintiff is basing his or her UCL
suit on the "unlawful" prong of the statute, thus claiming that the
violation of another statute is grounds for a violation of the UCL, the
underlying statute does not need to confer a private right of action for
the UCL claim to be justiciable.34 This is true even when the
underlying statute in question is a criminal law.35 This means that
there is essentially no standing requirement for the UCL, as any
plaintiff may file a suit-so long as they claim to be doing so in the
interests of the general public. "The result is that any person may
become a quasi-prosecutor, selecting deep pocket targets at will for
enforcement of section 17200's broad proscriptions.
''36
30. Id. at 990, 997-98.
31. PRIDGEN, CONSUMER PROTECrION AND THE LAw app. 3A (1997).
32. Axelrad et al., supra note 28, at 3 (quoting Unfair Competition Litigation, 26 CAL.
L. REVISION COMMISSION REP. 207 (1996)).
33. See People v. Cappuccio, Inc., 251 Cal. Rptr. 657, 662-63 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988);
Axelrad et al., supra note 28, at 2.
34. Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 950 P.2d 1086,1093 (Cal. 1998).
35. Id. at 1094-95.
36. Axelrad et al., supra note 28, at 3.
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H. Examples of How the Aforementioned UCL Problems
Have Allowed Plaintiffs to Enforce Their Own Public Policy
Agenda
This next section will consider how the problems of the UCL
have increasingly allowed plaintiffs to enforce their private public
policy concerns. I will look at three cases in chronological order. In
these cases I will identify the problems of over-inclusive standing and
broad statutory prohibition, and show how one or both of these
problems have created the third problem of private enforcement of
individual policy goals.
A. Committee on Children's Television, Ina v. General Foods Corp.
In Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods
Corp.,37 the plaintiffs sued the maker of breakfast cereals claiming
"fraudulent, misleading and deceptive advertising in the marketing of
[these] sugared breakfast cereals. ' '38 The plaintiffs included The
Committee on Children's Television, Inc. and the California Society
of Dentistry, as well as individual adults and children.39 The suit was
filed as a class action on behalf of "California residents who have
been misled or deceived, or are threatened with the likelihood of
being deceived or misled" 4 by the defendant in connection with the
marketing of sugared cereals. The cereals in question were "Alpha
Bits, Honeycomb, Fruity Pebbles, Sugar Crisp, and Cocoa Pebbles-
which contain from 38 to 50 percent sugar by weight."'41 The first
cause of action, based upon the UCL, alleged that the defendant
engaged in a false advertising program, capitalizing on the
susceptibilities of children, to "induce them to consume products
which, although promoted and labeled as 'cereals' are in fact more
accurately described as sugar products, or candies." 42
It should be apparent that the distinction between a "candy
breakfast," and a cereal that contains a substantial amount of sugar, is
an individual subjective determination-not the basis for a claim of
false advertising. It seems clear that the impetus behind the plaintiffs'
complaint had little to do with false advertising, but instead was a
desire to advance their own policy goals: namely to stop the
37. 673 P.2d 660 (Cal. 1983).
38. Id. at 663.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 663-64.
41. IM at 664.
42. Id
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advertising that enticed children to eat sugar-based cereals for
breakfast, and therefore, curb the practice itself. This assertion is
substantiated by the fact that one of the plaintiffs in Children's
Television was the California Society of Dentistry for Children. 43
While encouraging children to eat sugar-based breakfasts is clearly
not illegal, the plaintiffs were able to use the UCL to successfully
state a cause of action to enjoin this practice.44 Thus, Children's
Television is an early example of a plaintiff capitalizing upon the flaws
of the UCL to advance his own policy goals.
The broad scope of the UCL is partially responsible for the
outcome in Children's Television. The court stated: "The term
'unfair competition' receives a broad definition... [and] is not
confined to anti-competitive business practice but is equally directed
toward 'the right of the public to protection from fraud and deceit.'
' 45
In theory, this sounds like a good idea, but in this case, the plaintiff's
cause of action is likely based upon a violation of his own policy goals
under the guise of a UCL violation.
The primary significance of Children's Television is that it was
the first case to hold that the UCL granted unqualified standing to a
private party.46  The plaintiffs in this case were not business
competitors or even an allegedly harmed consumer of breakfast
cereals, but instead it was a group of private organizations. Upset
with the defendant for allegedly exploiting the susceptibility of
children, and encouraging them to eat a breakfast with a high sugar
content, the plaintiffs had standing to file suit under the UCL.47 The
plaintiffs suffered no personal harm, yet the court states "[a UCL suit
may proceed] without individualized proof of deception, reliance and
injury. '48  Thus, interpreting a virtual lack of any standing
requirement, the court permitted this group of private plaintiffs to
initiate a lawsuit aimed at advancing the policy goal of one faction of
society.
Brought in 1983, this case is an early example of the court's
willingness to broadly interpret the UCL's standing provision, and
43. Id.
44. Id at 676-77.
45. Id. at 667 (emphasis omitted).
46. Id at 667-68 (elevating to a holding, dicta from Barquis v. Merchants Collection
Ass'n, 496 P.2d 817, 828 (Cal. 1972)).
47. Children's Television, 673 P.2d at 667-68.
48. Id at 668-69.
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was highly influential in the court's subsequent decision on standing
in Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc.
49
B. Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc.
Even more than Children's Television, Stop Youth Addiction is a
blatant example of a private plaintiff abusing the UCL to advance his
own policy goals. The plaintiff in this case, a private citizen, used the
UCL to sue defendant Lucky Stores for allegedly selling cigarettes to
minors in violation of California Penal Code section 308.50 The
plaintiff claimed that because Lucky Stores sold cigarettes to minors,
who eventually became addicted to smoking, and illegally profited
from these sales, that the defendant should therefore pay back these
ill-gotten profits, as restitution to the State of California.51 The
court-rejecting the defendant's arguments of plaintiff's lack of
standing and the legitimate policy concerns of allowing this suit to
proceed-held for the plaintiff.52 While this case would have been
proper if it had been advanced by a public plaintiff such as the state
attorney general, allowing a private plaintiff to essentially enforce
criminal law is an abuse of the UCL and a dangerous precedent for
the court to set. The UCL "was certainly not intended to encompass
criminal proceedings lying within the exclusive, constitutionally
assigned powers of public prosecutors.
'53
The defendant in Stop Youth Addiction made essentially the
same argument that the D.C. Circuit made in their holding in
Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp.; namely, that a private plaintiff
should not have standing to bring a cause of action based upon the
violation of a criminal statute.54 Lucky Stores argued that the court
should look to the legislative intent of the underlying statute-"if the
Legislature did not include an express private right of action in the
enforcement scheme for the underlying law," the court should not
allow a private UCL action to proceed based upon this law.55 The
majority in Stop Youth Addiction rejected the defendant's argument,
stating that "whether a private right of action should be implied under
[the predicate] statute... is immaterial since any unlawful business
49. 950 P.2d 1086 (Cal. 1998).
50. Id at 1089.
51. Id
52. Id. at 1086-1102.
53. Id at 1109 (Brown, J., dissenting).
54. Id at 560-76; Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 990, 997-98 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
55. Stop Youth Addiction, Inc., 950 P.2d at 1091.
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practice... may be redressed by a private action charging unfair
competition in violation of Business and Professions Code sections
17200 and 17203."56 This is clearly a fallacious argument-the
majority in Stop Youth Addiction is assuming their conclusion.
Justice Brown's dissent in Stop Youth Addiction asserted that
granting the plaintiff standing in this case undermined the separation
of powers doctrine 5 7 Allowing a private party standing to use a
criminal law violation as a cause of action
undermines the separation of powers in multiple ways: by granting
private actors the right to vindicate the public interest, by
extinguishing the historical limits on the rights of private litigants to
invoke the remedial powers of the courts, and by depriving the
executive of its constitutionally assigned discretion to enforce the
Law.58
Thus, the dissent meant that by allowing a private party to
enforce criminal law, the court was usurping a power traditionally
delegated to the executive (in this case, the power of the public
prosecutor to try criminal offenses).5 9 "For one arm of government to
exercise an 'essential power' of another threatens the constitutional
integrity of the coordinate branch. The doctrine of standing serves as
a judicial means of preventing one branch from exercising a
constitutional power that properly belongs to another. '60
The dissent further argued that conferring standing to a private
party that has suffered no injury contributes to the separation of
powers problem.61 "And so long as a private litigant suing under the
UCL is able to allege and prove a species of judicially cognizable
harm, private suits under the UCL do not raise significant separation
of powers concerns." 62 At the very least, requiring that a private
plaintiff have been personally harmed by the criminal acts in question
would limit standing such that UCL suits could not be brought by a
party merely seeking to assert their own policy agenda. In the public
sector, prosecutors have a duty to use their discretion in charging a
defendant with a criminal violation.63  No such "prosecutorial
discretion" is required of a private plaintiff who maintains a UCL suit
56. Id. (quoting Children's Television, 673 P.2d at 668).
57. Id. at 1109-10 (Brown, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 1109.
59. See id. at 1109-10.
60. Id. at 1110.
61. Id. at 1111.
62. 1d.
63. Id. at 1112.
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on a criminal law. The dissent raised this point, writing that "[u]nlike
prosecutors, whose authority is curbed by established notions of
ethical responsibility, private enforcement of the UCL is unchecked
and unfettered. The potential for abuse in such a system is
manifest." 64 Thus, the defendant in a UCL suit based upon a criminal
law violation does not enjoy the safeguards of "detachment,
neutrality, and evenhandedness," that would be present had the suit
been initiated by a public prosecutor.
65
The court's expansion of the standing requirement in Stop Youth
Addiction creates a dangerous precedent. Before the decision in Stop
Youth Addiction, the California Supreme Court had never held that a
private plaintiff had standing to bring suit under the UCL's
"unlawful" prong where the predicate statute clearly did not confer a
private right of action. Stop Youth Addiction not only upheld the
problematic over-inclusive standing provision of the UCL, it greatly
expanded this provision. Now, any underlying statutory violation,
including a violation of criminal law, can be enforced by a private
party through the UCL. The court in Stop Youth Addiction has
created the exact legal world that the D.C. Circuit in Holloway
warned of: the opportunity for any private member of society to act
as a public prosecutor.
It is not difficult to make the connection between the court's
holding on the issue of standing, and the potential for a private
plaintiff to use the UCL as a means to advance his own policy goals.
Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. was a for-profit corporation, established
by the attorney for the plaintiff, whose sole shareholder was this
attorney's mother.66 The corporation had no source of funding other
than a $1,000 payment that the mother of plaintiff's attorney made to
her son in exchange for "stock."67 The corporation had no other
employees and its only business was in filing lawsuits.68 Additionally,
Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. "employed children as decoys in privately
run 'sting' operations to obtain evidence of illegal cigarette sales by
some or all of the defendants. ' 69 This "case is one of eight nearly
identical suits... [together seeking] more than $50 billion in
restitution as well as injunctive relief... against almost 2,000
defendants, most of whom appear to be small retailers. Each suit
64. Id
65. Id at 1113.






seeks attorney fees. '70  Thus, the plaintiff established a shell
corporation with the intent of trying to ameliorate the sales of
cigarettes to minors while collecting attorney's fees for himself. The
UCL was certainly not drafted to effectuate such a result. Regardless
of whether his asserted policy goals were noble or disingenuous, it
was unwise to allow him to further these goals in the role of a criminal
prosecutor. This result allows any person with a personal vendetta
towards a particular industry to use the UCL to achieve vigilante
justice.
The second identified UCL problem, its vague statutory
language and sweeping scope, 71 is also responsible for allowing this
particular plaintiff to further his policy agenda. The plaintiffs UCL
claim was based upon the "unlawful" prong of the statute. The
unlawful prong, allowing a UCL cause of action for the violation of
any other law, is not vague in what it covers. It is, however,
extraordinarily broad, "[extending] the statute's reach to 'anything
that can properly be called a business practice and at the same time is
forbidden by law."'72 When a criminal law is used as the predicate
statute, the UCL's effect on a defendant "is virtually the same as if
[the suit] had been brought directly under the Penal Code."73 This
broad base from which to generate a cause of action, coupled with the
virtual lack of any standing requirement, allowed this plaintiff to
manipulate the court system in order to achieve his own policy goals.
C. Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co.
Children's Television and Stop Youth Addiction are excellent
examples of the UCL's standing requirement allowing an individual
to effectuate his own policy goals. Similarly, Cel-Tech
Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co.74 clearly
illustrates how the vagueness of the UCL's statutory prohibitions can
be manipulated to further contribute to the problem of a plaintiff
using public policy as the basis of his lawsuit.
The parties in this case were competitors in the business of
selling cellular telephones25 The defendant sold cellular services as
70. Id.
71. See supra text accompanying notes 11-23.
72. Stop Youth Addiction, Inc., 950 P.2d at 1108 (Brown, J., dissenting) (quoting Note,
Unlawful Agricultural Working Conditions as Nuisance or Unfair Competition, 19
HASTINGS L.J. 398, 408-09 (1968)).
73. Id. at-1113.
74. 973 P.2d 527 (Cal. 1999).
75. Id. at 532.
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well as telephones, whereas the plaintiff only sold telephones.76 The
market for cellular services was a regulated industry, and "[the
defendant] [had] a government-protected 'duopoly' status with one
other company."77 Thus, the plaintiffs were not allowed to enter the
cellular services market. "In an effort to gain new subscribers for its
services and increase overall profits, [the defendant] sold telephones
below cost. It lost money on telephone sales but made up for those
losses with its increased sales of services. '78 The plaintiffs claimed
that "because they are not allowed to sell services, they cannot fairly
compete with L.A. Cellular's strategy of selling telephones below cost
and recouping the losses with profits on the sales of services. ' '79 Their
lawsuit was based, in part, on the UCL.
80
This case forced the court to interpret the "unfair" prong of the
UCL. The business practices utilized by the defendant were not
illegal, and thus, were not susceptible to a cause of action based upon
the "unlawful" prong of the UCL.8s This situation presented the
novel query of when an act that is lawful, can nonetheless be deemed
unfair.
The court first determined that an act cannot be labeled unfair if
the Legislature has "permitted certain conduct or considered a
situation and concluded no action should lie." 82  However, clear
statutory language was required: "[t]o forestall an action under the
unfair competition law, another provision must actually 'bar' the
action or clearly permit the conduct. ' 83 Thus, had there been
statutory authorization for the defendant's business practices in
question, this would have ended the unfair inquiry.
If the Legislature is silent on the business act in question, the
court held that the challenged practice may be considered unfair
under the UCL: "the Legislature's mere failure to prohibit an activity
does not prevent a court from finding it unfair."84 Acknowledging
that this definition of unfair was still too broad, the court stated that
"we believe we must devise a more precise test for determining what






81. Id at 533.
82. Id at 541.
83. Id
84. Id at 542.
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for guidance to the jurisprudence arising under the 'parallel' section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act."85 Using section 5 of the FTC
Act as a guideline, the court came up with the following test for
unfairness under the UCL: "the word 'unfair' in that section means
conduct that threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or
violates the policy or spirit of one of those laws because its effects are
comparable to the same as a violation of the law, or otherwise
significantly threatens or harms competition. ' 86 This new definition
of "unfair" is inconsistent with earlier dicta in Cel-Tech, improperly
modeled after the FTC Act, and does little to solve the problem of an
over-broad law giving a plaintiff a means in which to assert his own
policy agenda.
Before crafting this policy-based definition of unfairness, the
court earlier warned of the use of public policy in UCL litigation.
Courts may not simply impose their own notions of the day as to
what is fair or unfair.... Vague references to "public policy," for
example, provide little real guidance.87 "Public policy as a concept
is notoriously resistant to precise definition, and... courts should
venture into this area, if at all, with great care."88
The court did not explain this inconsistency when they crafted
the definition of unfairness to include "[violations of] the policy or
spirit of one of [the antitrust laws]."8 9 The only justification given was
that this unfairness standard is modeled after the standard used in
section 5 of the FTC Act.
The problem with the analogy between California's UCL and the
FTC Act is multifaceted. As previously discussed, the UCL has
virtually no standing requirement.90 Conversely, the FTC act is only
enforceable by the Federal Trade Commission itself, not private
parties. Thus, "the interpretation of section 5 that the FTC has
developed is an administrative standard, whose enforcement is
subject to the informed discretion of an administrative agency with
considerable economic expertise and regulatory experience." 91 The
safeguards of prosecutorial discretion and ethical responsibility that
are present in an FTC case do not exist in a privately enforced UCL
85. Id. at 543 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(5)).
86. Id. at 544 (emphasis added).
87. 1d at 541, 543.
88. Id at 543 (quoting Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680, 687 (Cal. 1992)).
89. Id. at 544.
90. See supra text accompanying notes 24-36; Stop Youth Addiction, Inc., 950 P.2d at
1095, 1109-12.
91. Cel-Tech Communications, Inc., 973 P.2d at 553 (Kennard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
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case. Additionally, the FTC cannot sue for restitution or attorney's
fees, but is "limited to awarding only prospective relief in the form of
a 'cease-and-desist order' instructing the business to modify its future
conduct." 92  Contrast this remedy with the massive restitutionary
penalties that businesses often face when found liable under the
UCL.93 Finally, while it is clear that the policy underlying the FTC
Act is federal antitrust law, "[t]he majority never identifies what body
of antitrust law it supposes the Legislature intended to incorporate
into [the UCL]: Federal antitrust law? State antitrust law? Some
amalgamation of the two?" 94 Thus, it is fallacious to draw an analogy
between California's UCL and the FTC Act.
Cel-Tech's new test for unfairness under the UCL exacerbates
the potential for a private plaintiff to abuse the UCL to further his
own policy goals. Although the plaintiff in this case may have had a
legitimate business concern, the court's definition of unfairness will
allow subsequent plaintiffs to bring forth UCL cases based upon their
own interpretation of the "policy or spirit" of antitrust laws.
Additionally, "[a] business seeking to guide its competitive conduct
by the majority's standard will be put to the impossible task of
deciding whether its conduct, even though not a violation of the
antitrust laws, violates the 'spirit' of the antitrust laws." 95  With
unlimited standing, a plaintiff now has even more ability to bring a
UCL case based upon his own policy agenda; he need only plead that
the defendant's conduct violates the spirit of antitrust law-a
requirement that can be easily manipulated.
I. The Future of UCL Jurisprudence
"[T]he majority [in Cel-Tech] expands potential liability under
the UCL for 'unfair' practices, again importing subjectivity into a law
that no longer gives fair warning of conduct that may be deemed
unlawful. '96 The immediate effect of the court's ruling in Cel-Tech
will be vast uncertainty among the business community as to what
business practices could be found unfair under the UCL.
In the past, the court has given extreme deference to the
Legislature, voicing its reluctance to curtail the power of the UCL:
92. Id. at 554 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 45).
93. Id
94. Id. at 550.
95. Id. at 553.
96. Id at 557-58 (Baxter, J., concurring and dissenting).
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[H]ad the Legislature at any time desired to change the UCL so as
to restrict its application.., it undeniably had ample time to do
so.... [W]henever the Legislature has acted to amend the UCL, it
has done so only to expand its scope... should the Legislature
disagree with [the holding in Stop Youth Addiction], it remains free
to provide otherwise.97
There is no sign that the court will assume a more activist role in
the future to combat current UCL abuses. If the court continues to
exhibit blind deference to the Legislature, in the face of statutory
abuse, then it becomes the Legislature's responsibility to implement
the necessary UCL changes.
The most dire future implication of the court's line of UCL
holdings is the one that this Note has cautioned against. The court is
laying the groundwork for a UCL lawsuit to be brought by a private
plaintiff based solely on a business practice that he or she dislikes.
The result would be disastrous-a state of vigilante justice against
unpopular industries.
IV. Solutions to Limit UCL Abuse and Private Policy
Enforcement
The first solution to remedy the abuse of using the UCL to
further private policy concerns is to elevate the threshold necessary to
satisfy the "unfair" prong of the statute. The test for an "unfair" act
needs to be amended in one of two ways. After Cel-Tech, UCL
unfairness suits may be brought based on nothing more than a policy
violation. The test for unfairness should not allow a UCL action to
proceed on policy alone-there should be a violation of a law in
conjunction with a policy violation. Alternatively, if the court is
insistent in maintaining the current test for unfairness, they have a
responsibility to catalogue the specific policy considerations that, if
violated, would form the basis for a UCL cause of action. In this way,
a private party could not try to proceed with a UCL claim based on its
own notion of correct public policy.
Secondly, the standing requirement needs to be modified to only
allow private plaintiffs standing when they can show that they have
been personally harmed by the defendant's conduct. The prerequisite
of personal injury before a lawsuit can be brought is fundamental in
our legal system, and should not be abrogated in this context. A
personal harm requirement would eliminate lawsuits by plaintiffs who
would have no foundation for standing outside of the UCL. This
97. Stop Youth Addiction, Inc., 950 P.2d at 1092, 1097,1102.
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would also severely limit the potential for a detached, opportunistic
plaintiff to sue an unpopular industry.
98
Finally, the court needs to freely incorporate the unclean hands
doctrine of abstention in cases where it is apparent that a plaintiff is
misusing the UCL to further his own policy agenda. As the
concurrence in Stop Youth Addiction underscores:
[I]njunctive relief is an equitable remedy [and] whether to grant
that relief lies in the sound discretion of the trial court.... [If the
plaintiff] has initiated the action for reasons other than redressing
unfair business practices, or has engaged in extortionate conduct in
initiating and/or prosecuting the action, the trial court may well
determine that equitable relief should be denied.99
A liberally applied unclean hands doctrine could serve as a check
on malicious private prosecution of the UCL, analogous to the duties
of ethical responsibility and prosecutorial discretion that constrain the
actions of the public prosecutor.
Conclusion
California's Unfair Competition Law is no longer being used as it
was originally intended. Instead of serving as a tool to combat acts of
unfair competition unknown at its inception, the law has evolved to
become "a bounty-hunter type regulatory mechanism of enormous
elasticity." 1" The UCL's unlimited grant of standing and vaguely
defined prohibitions have allowed private parties to use the law to
further their own public policy interests. The problems with the UCL
must be addressed and corrected to avoid a state of vigilante justice.
98. Id at 1086-102.
99. Id at 1104 (Baxter, J., concurring).
100. Sullivan, supra note 5, at 22.
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